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Race and Tradition 
As I begin to write this my tribal election season is at hand. As usual, all the 
candidates claim to be "traditional." This is a claim easy to make and hard to 
disprove. What is traditional? We are now over half Christian, and more of us 
speak English than speak Cherokee. Many of the accoutrements of contempo-
rary identity have roots in recent times: frybread, ribbon shirts, jingle dresses, 
powwows. On the other hand, some items of earlier provenance, such as blowguns 
and turbans, surprise some modern Cherokees. We date our first written laws 
from 1808.1 We have lived under a series of written constitutions, the longest 
lasting those of 18392 and 1975.3 Is written law traditional? More to the point of 
this article, is the current Cherokee law of citizenship, a race-based law like that 
of most American Indian tribes,4 traditional? 
I hope to show that the idea of "race" is, in Partha Chatterjee's phrase 
describing nationalism, "a derivative discourse."5 It is not only derived from 
European colonial discourse, but it has done and continues to do harm to Indian 
nations on a scale similar to that of smallpox and measles.6 Pathogens are typi-
cally ranked by body count, and so my task here will be to demonstrate that race 
theory is an Old World pathogen that diminishes the numbers of American Indi-
ans on a scale that invites comparison to "guns, germs, and steel."7 It is perhaps 
instructive to read Chatterjee's words and substitute "race" for "nationalism": 
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Nationalism as an ideology is irrational, narrow, hateful and 
destructive. It is not an authentic product of any of the non-
European civilizations which, in each particular case, it claims 
as its classical heritage. It is wholly a European export to the 
rest of the world. It is also one of Europe's most pernicious 
exports, for it is not a child of reason or liberty, but of their 
opposite: of fervent romanticism, of political messianism 
whose inevitable consequence is the annihilation of freedom.8 
Can "race" properly be considered, like nationalism, an ideology? Accord-
ing to the American Anthropological Association: 
. . . physical variations in the human species have no meaning 
except the social ones that humans put on them. Today schol-
ars in many fields argue that "race" as it is understood in the 
United States of America was a social mechanism invented 
during the 18th century to refer to those populations brought 
together in colonial America: the English and other European 
settlers, the conquered Indian peoples, and those peoples of 
Africa brought in to provide slave labor. . . . As they were 
constructing U.S. society, leaders among European-Ameri-
cans fabricated the cultural/behavioral characteristics associ-
ated with each "race," linking superior traits with Europeans 
and negative and inferior ones to blacks and Indians.... Ul-
timately, "race" as an ideology about human differences was 
subsequently spread to other areas of the world. It became a 
strategy for dividing, ranking, and controlling colonized people 
used by colonial powers everywhere.9 
The AAA Statement refers in a part not quoted above to the "Great Chain 
of Being" theory as the philosophical basis for ranking people by race, a reli-
gious theory that looked to early anthropology for scientific support.10 Cultural 
anthropology was in turn supported in its endorsement of racial hierarchy by 
disciplines thought to be more empirical in content: archaeology and physical 
anthropology.11 Outside of Indian law, the primary postbellum legal expression 
of the "Great Chain of Being" was anti-miscegenation law,12 representing a le-
gal endorsement of racist ideology that was not declared unconstitutional by the 
U.S. Supreme Court until 1961.u 
If anthropology appears to have been slow to recognize the obvious, it is 
worth mentioning that Ashley Montagu's famous formulation of race as "man's 
most dangerous myth" dates from 1942, when Adolf Hitler was engaged in a 
spectacular attempt to govern a modern nation by that myth.14 Before World 
War II, Hitler expressed admiration for the U.S. handling of race: 
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There are numberless examples in history, showing with ter-
rible clarity how each time Aryan blood has become mixed 
with that of inferior peoples the result has been an end to the 
culture-sustaining race. North America, the population of 
which consists for the most part of Germanic elements, which 
mixed very little with inferior coloured nations, displays hu-
manity and culture very different from that of Central and 
South America, in which the settlers, mainly Latin in origin, 
mingled their blood very freely with that of the aborigines. 
Taking the above as an example, we clearly recognize the ef-
fects of racial intermixture. The man of Germanic race on the 
continent of America having kept himself pure and unmixed, 
has risen to be its master; and he will remain master as long as 
he does not fall into the shame of mixing the blood.15 
How much change is due to scientific progress and how much is due to 
staring into an abyss of horror is open to dispute—Montagu was certainly aware 
that he was lining up against Hitler, even if he could not then know the full 
extent of the damage racial ideology was causing. Whatever their motivation, 
contemporary physical anthropologists have joined cultural anthropologists in 
reconfiguring the conventional wisdom on the reality of race, putting forward 
as truisms that "[a]ll humans living today belong to a single species, Homo 
sapiens, and share a common descent There is great genetic diversity within 
all human populations. Pure races, in the sense of genetically homogenous popu-
lations, do not exist in the human species today, nor is there any evidence that 
they have ever existed in the past."16 The mapping of the human genome ap-
pears unlikely to alter these statements which, to be candid, are welcome to 
those on the lower links of the "Great Chain of Being."17 Of course, it must be 
simple coincidence that the originators of the "Great Chain of Being" religious 
and scientific theory were Europeans and the humans at the top link were Euro-
pean.18 
Race as a European Disease 
The settlement of the North American continent is just as little 
the consequence of any claim of right in any democratic or 
international sense; it was the consequence of a conscious-
ness of right which was rooted solely in the conviction of the 
superiority and therefore of the right of the white race. 
Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Industrie-Klub 
of Dusseldorf, Jan. 27, 1932.19 
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Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror can-
not deny.. . . 
Chief Justice John Marshall, 1823.20 
It's easy to forget, particularly after growing up "Indian," that Indians had 
no such concept of themselves before being "discovered." Most tribes had a 
word for "us" and a word for "not us." And, before white people, they also had 
a way for "not us" to become "us." If that were not so, we would have been 
more inbred than European royals by the time European royals started quarrel-
ing over which of them owned us. 
Cherokees were Ani-Yun Wiya, the Real People. I have always assumed 
that we called white people yonega, white, because that is what they call them-
selves. Our ancestors could observe that white people are not in fact white, 
excepting albinos. I have done some asking around with other tribes, and I get 
"white" and "strangers" and "big knives" and, of course, the Lakota wasichu, 
"takes the fat," which is not particularly complimentary but is still descriptive 
rather than dehumanizing. 
Tribal people separate the world between extended family and everybody 
else. I would not argue that this keeps us from treating outsiders badly, but if we 
do, our rudeness proceeds without scientific pretension. There was also some 
fluidity between outsider and insider status, and early on this was possible with-
out regard to color. To the extent that this has changed, the change appears to be 
an artifact of colonialism. Spanish and Portuguese colonial societies were ob-
sessed with color as an indicator of African or Indian blood, and that obsession 
lives on today in Latin America. As the Indians of America del Sur learned the 
importance of color from their colonizers,21 so my people in America del Norte 
were instructed by our English colonizers. 
History on the popular level seldom adverts to the fact that part of the 
"civilizing" of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes was instruction in the institu-
tion of chattel slavery. Our oral traditions tell us that Cherokees understood 
slavery as a concomitant of failure in warfare, at the least a temporary status 
pending adoption or release;22 if death were the result, it would happen right 
away. Cherokees were first introduced to the idea of chattel slavery by the En-
glish, but the view was from the bottom—as slaves rather than slaveholders.23 
Eventually, the English were able to convert at least well-to-do Cherokees from 
the Indian view of slavery to the "civilized" understanding of human beings as 
property.24 
The slave trade was well established by the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury among the Cherokee,25 a people who obviously did no raiding in Africa. 
This unfortunate education in racism by the English led to Cherokees lining up 
on both sides of the American Civil War26 and, just as tragically, to some Chero-
kees beginning to find social significance in skin color.27 That tragedy continues 
to play out in the struggles of black Cherokees to achieve formal equality in 
Cherokee law.28 
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The Cherokee were of course not the only Indian peoples seduced by the 
ideology of color prejudice.29 Some kind of nadir was reached in 2002 by a 
Lakota—if not a nadir of racism, then a nadir of shortsightedness. Author and 
Adjunct Professor at Connecticut College Delphine Red Shirt,3Q writing in the 
Hartford Courant,31 opined that she was offended by Connecticut's definition 
of "Indian": 
Why? Because I am an Indian. I grew up Indian, look 
Indian, even speak Indian. So it offends me to come east and 
to see how "Indian" is defined in this state that I now call 
home. 
What offends me? That on the outside {where it counts in 
America s racially conscious society), Indians in Connecticut 
do not appear Indian. In fact, the Indians in Connecticut look 
more like they come from European or African stock. When I 
see them, whether they are Pequot, Mohegan, Paugussett, 
Paucatuck or Schaghticoke, I want to say, "These are not In-
dians." But I've kept quiet. 
I can't stay quiet any longer. These are not Indians.... 
There are no remnants left of the indigenous peoples that 
had proudly lived in Connecticut. What is here is all legally 
created. The blood is gone. 
So, who are they? They are descendants, perhaps—though 
even that seems questionable—of the once proud people who 
lived in this state called "Quinecktecut." These races have 
died out. Here's how: 
What if, in 1700, a Pequot married a European or Afri-
can, and 30 years later their half-blood offspring married an-
other European or African and so on? By the early 1800s, that 
blood would be less than 1/32 Indian. By 2002, if the pattern 
continued, that Indian blood would be virtually nonexistent. 
Yet, a person could identify herself as a descendent of that 1/ 
32 Pequot and be considered Indian... . 
Is she? I say no. (All emphases added.) 
It would help to accomplish understanding, if not agreement, to put Red 
Shirt's remarks in the context where they were made. A number of Connecticut 
tribes are seeking federal recognition, and these petitions are highly controver-
sial because the good citizens of Connecticut fear a repetition of the success of 
the Mashantucket Pequot Foxwoods Resort and Casino.32 
Kevin Gover, the Pawnee Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs on whose 
watch during the Clinton Administration some of the objects of Red Shirt's 
dudgeon were recognized, replied in the pages of Indian Country Today: 
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As I understand her position, Connecticut Indians are not 
Indians because they do not look like her, do not act like her, 
do not speak like her, do not—well, you get the picture. (They 
also do not have cool names like hers, but she forgot to men-
tion that.) Expect to see Ms. Red Shirt trotted out every time 
some white people want to say something ugly about Indian 
people but dare not do so because they would be labeled as 
racists. 
I think we brown-skinned, black-haired Indians had bet-
ter be careful about what we say about New England Indians. 
There are fewer and fewer full-bloods among us. If being In-
dian means looking a certain way, then most tribes are only 
two or three generations from extermination. 
The New England Indians did what they had to do to 
survive. They intermarried and accommodated the overwhelm-
ing presence of non-Indians. Yet they persevered and main-
tained themselves, some of them, as distinct social, political 
and cultural communities. Are they the same as the Indians 
who greeted the English and Dutch settlers in the 17th cen-
tury? Of course not. But then few if any tribes closely re-
semble their pre-Columbian ancestors.33 
Gover's response came after a flurry of similar letters to the Courant and 
an editorial denunciation by Indian Country Today, which has also discontin-
ued her status as a columnist.34 My purpose is not to dispute Red Shirt who, 
after all, only stated her opinion. I offer her opinion as an example of the 
conflation of tribe with race and Indian identity with phenotype that has always 
been common outside of Indian tribes and is now unfortunately also becoming 
common within them. 
Citizenship by Blood Quantum 
Citizenship by blood quantum alone is a guarantee of physical extinction. 
Know the tribal population, the required blood quantum, birth and death rates, 
rate of exogamous marriage, and the date of extinction is easily calculated. This 
is not opinion. This is arithmetic. 
The reality of blood quantum extinction has swept North America gener-
ally east to west, although the genocide of the California tribes was so spectacu-
larly successful35 that most of the least touched tribal groups are west of the 
Mississippi but east of the Rockies. Indian policy in the United States has al-
ways been marked by differences of opinion about the proper route to the goal 
of extinguishing the aboriginal peoples. 
The conservative position was the military option that lost political traction 
when the advent of photography caused the Wounded Knee Massacre in 1890 
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to be perceived as a massacre—a political result of technology not unlike the 
modern videotaping of the Los Angeles Police Department (in the words of my 
days as a police magistrate) "putting a few don't bumps" on Rodney King. Spotted 
Elk's (AKABig Foot) band was no more the first massacre of Indian non-com-
batants than Rodney King's shellacking was the first police beating of a black 
motorist, but in both cases technology took the truth beyond the victimized 
community. 
The liberal path to extermination was less barbaric but probably had more 
impact. The process was directed less to physical existence and more to Indian 
cultural identity. For white liberals, deculturation was in our best interests, as 
expressed in the dictum "kill the Indian in him to save the man." This shorthand 
expression of the forced assimilation policy was attributed to Richard Henry 
Pratt, founder of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, who in fact used the 
phrase in a paper read in Denver in 1892.36 It was sometimes reported as "kill 
the Indian child." In either iteration, it is an apt description of the policy, but 
Pratt had no motive to harm Indians.37 
Separating Indian children from their heritage was done with the best of 
intentions.38 Whatever the stated motive, the results were the same from the 
reservation years until 1933: traditional religious ceremonies banned, Indian 
boys forced to cut their hair, Indian adults "converted" to Christianity by with-
holding rations, Indian children kidnapped and forced into boarding schools 
where Indian languages were banned, Indian adults forbidden to criticize the 
government and required to obtain passports to travel from one concentration 
camp, I mean reservation, to another. The Indian New Deal, John Collier's ten-
ure as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, began in 1933,39 and his attempts to 
reverse generations of official deculturation met with mixed success. Language 
rebounds with difficulty, but more easily than religion, which rebounds more 
easily than clan organization. Some aspects of culture are simply gone. 
U.S. deculturation policies also benefited from the Indian policies of other 
colonial powers. The Spanish got started earlier than the English on the task of 
destroying Indian cultures. By the time the United States took the Southwest 
from Mexico by dictating the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hildago,40 most inhabitants 
of the area—Indian by blood with an admixture of African and Spanish41 — 
were generations removed from being punished by the Spanish for speaking 
Indian languages in school,42 so they were ready to have their children punished 
by the Anglos for speaking Spanish in school. And if that were not enough 
irony, the United States subsequently adopted an ahistorical and nonsensical 
identity called "Hispanic" that placed the Indians and their former Spanish op-
pressors in the same census category!43 Census categories have changed, but the 
disappearance of Indians in Hispanic America remains. 
From the perspective of Indians in the United States, we see two waves of 
Europeanization: the Spanish wave sweeping north from Mexico and the En-
glish wave sweeping east to west across North America, converging in a demo-
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graphie splash that is bound to get us all wet at some point. Blood quantum 
finds a legal role in these changes in a connection to the one aspect of coloniza-
tion that is as important from the colonial perspective as causing Indians to 
disappear: the mechanisms for separating Indians from their land. The ground 
was laid innocently enough with Chief Justice John Marshall's "domestic, de-
pendent nations"44 formulation, a legal coup that has been compared to his magi-
cal creation of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison,45 in that both "...extri-
cated the court from the rough seas of politics with procedural sleight of hand."46 
It is important that we are "nations" so we cede land in treaties only lightly 
dipped in the blood of conquest, "domestic" so that when we disappear our land 
titles escheat to the United States, and "dependent" so the United States can 
choose the time and manner of the disappearance. 
The first stage of disappearance was the idea of "reservations," a term that 
suffers from the alterity between the colonizers and the colonized, the former 
perceiving some sort of gift to the aboriginals for as long as they remain red 
enough and/or backward enough to deserve and/or need the gift. The Indians, 
on the other hand, think of themselves as the givers and of their remaining lands 
as what they reserved for their own use. Whether the root of the misunderstand-
ing was the meaning of "reservation" or simply a quaint notion of honor among 
the simple savages,47 the lethal idea of blood quantum entered federal Indian 
policy if not federal Indian law with the implementation of the General Allot-
ment Act in 1887. 
Paul Spruhan, a law clerk for the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, has pro-
duced an exhaustive legal history of blood quantum that traces its origins from 
the simple idea of ancestry as understood in laws of descent and distribution. As 
race theory established itself in law as a vehicle to disadvantage blacks and 
Indians, blood quantum became a method of identifying persons to be disad-
vantaged. By the nineteenth century, one-eighth black blood was enough to keep 
the phenotypically white Homer Plessy from sitting where he pleased on public 
transportation.48 "Blood quantum became an important method of defining In-
dian and tribal membership only in the early twentieth century."49 Oddly enough, 
blood quantum appeared in Indian rolls (typically taken by agents of the U.S. 
government) before it appeared in law books. 
By the time the Curtis Act of 189850 extended allotment to the so-called 
Five Civilized Tribes for the purpose of turning Indian Territory into the State 
of Oklahoma, blood quantum was being collected by the Dawes Commission 
based upon prior rolls, sworn testimony, and by eyeballing51 the applicants. The 
authority to collect this information is unclear to this writer, except that thinking 
in terms of the government needing authority to require information from Indi-
ans is perhaps anachronistic. 
Of course, there was resistance to allotment, which was and is from the 
Indian point of view the theft of land given in exchange for land that was stolen 
in the first place. In addition to the litigation that culminated in the leading 
treaty abrogation case, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903), there was the "Snake 
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Uprising" led by Chitto Harjo among the Muscogee (Creek), and there was 
both lobbying and active resistance led by Redbird Smith among the Chero-
kee.52 According to my middle school Oklahoma history text, it took U.S. mar-
shals and cavalry to enforce Creek and Cherokee allotment.53 Resistance was 
centered in but certainly not confined to Oklahoma.54 
In spite of litigation and civil disobedience and violence, allotment of In-
dian reservations proceeded. In a 1906 act purporting to finally wind up the 
affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes, Congress restricted the alienation of allot-
ments by "full-bloods" and made other references to citizenship by blood in 
connection with "intermarried whites" and "freedmen."55 Then the Burke Act of 
1906 opened a big hole in the General Allotment Act's protective restrictions on 
alienation by providing that 
. . . the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he 
is hereby authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any 
Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or 
her own affairs, at any time cause to be issued to such allottee 
a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, 
incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed "56 
Between 1917 and 1920, blood quantum was taken by the Secretary "in his 
discretion" as a proxy for competency.57 
When descendents of people victimized by the Secretary's discretion fi-
nally got to court in 1985, Chief Judge Donald J. Porter indulged some of the 
wry understatement (and passive voice) that suffuses federal Indian law when 
he observed that "(a)buses were rampant. . ."58 However, he found no remedy 
for the abuses in the law. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals repeated Judge 
Porter's clever observation59 but still found no remedy. The Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari without comment. 
Higher blood quantum meant more restrictions on alienability of the allot-
ment. White blood was hoped (or not, depending on one's cynicism) to be a 
qualification for dealing with great white land sharks.60 With blood quantum 
determining substantive rights during allotment, rights that were the only ad-
vantage to being perceived as Indian by the dominant culture, blood quantum as 
a determinant of citizenship was not a great leap. 
Blood quantum as a determinant of citizenship might have been new to 
most Indians, but exogamy was not. As the Cherokee demographer Russell 
Thornton has pointed out, during early colonial times, the colonizers had a sur-
plus of men while the colonized peoples often had a shortage of men.61 Inter-
marriage started soon after the first contact with Europeans and continues apace 
to this day, with a majority of Indians choosing exogamous marriages.62 The 
collective result of these individual choices is an inevitable decline in blood 
quantum.63 
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Deward Walker has produced a demographic study for the Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation that illustrates the trap of 
blood quantum. In connection with a referendum on changing citizenship re-
quirements, the Tribal Council requested demographic projections based upon 
three scenarios: (1) changing enrollment to allow all lineal descendants of cur-
rent citizens to enroll, (2) changing the blood quantum requirement to 1/4 from 
any tribe for the descendants of current citizens, or (3) maintaining the current 
blood quantum requirement of 1/4 Salish or Kootenai blood.64 
Using the current standard of 1/4 Salish or Kootenai blood quantum, Walker 
found " . . . the only possible projection is one of decrease."65 Enrollment in the 
base year of 1999 was 6,953. The new enrollment and death rates converged in 
2002 (65 new enrollments and 63 deaths)66 and the slide from zero population 
growth to population loss leads to a projected population of 6,400 in 2020.67 
Altering the blood quantum requirement to include all Indian blood in de-
scendants of current citizens results in a short term spike up to 7,700 in 2010 
followed by a steady decline thereafter and a projected population of 7,290 in 
2020.68 
The lineal descent from current citizens scenario naturally results in an 
exponential growth of the population eligible for enrollment. The number of 
eligible persons is projected at 21,524 in 2020, and the long-term trend contin-
ues upward.69 This raises a different set of questions. How many of those eli-
gible would choose to enroll and why? Put another way, is there a basis to 
choose between physical extinction and cultural extinction? 
Citizenship by Direct Descent 
Citizenship by direct descent alone is a guarantee of cultural extinction. In 
what sense is someone who has the blood but no knowledge of language, reli-
gion, or culture Indian? Answer: in a racist sense. What do you preserve when 
you define such people as Indian? Answer: racial privilege. My own nation has 
taken that path, even as the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted the position that 
inclusion by ancestry is exclusion by race.70 
The first reported intermarriage between my people and the colonists was 
in 1690. "White Cherokees" were numerous by 1810, and it was the 1/8 Chero-
kee great-grandson of a Scots trader, Chief John Ross, who led the tribe during 
its tragic confrontation with Euro-American greed that culminated with the death 
of thousands on the Trail of Tears.71 
The race/ethnicity/phenotype issue is further complicated by Cherokee in-
termarriage with blacks and with other tribes of Indians.72 In addition, a number 
of ethnically African-American freedmen were enrolled as tribal members after 
the Civil War ended chattel slavery.73 Even in the early 19th century, " . . . it was 
difficult to define who was a Cherokee. . . . [T]he Cherokee Nation, like the 
United States, was multiracial. There were different kinds of Indians living among 
them—Catawba, Creek, Uchee, Osage; various Europeans—British, Spanish, 
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French, American; and there was a growing body of Africans (some freedmen, 
some slaves)."74 
The final rolls75 of the Five Civilized Tribes contained 101,50676 names, of 
which 26,774 were allegedly full-bloods.77 "Allegedly" because the full-bloods 
were overstated by the matrilineality of earlier generations of Cherokees78 and 
because the full-bloods were understated by the policy of counting mixed tribal 
descent as mixed blood. To the extent that the Dawes Commission was search-
ing for pure Indians at the turn of the 20th Century, that search was futile. The 
final rolls also contained about 3 percent adopted whites and 23 percent Afri-
can-American freedmen.79 This admixture demonstrates the absurdity of "race" 
as a determinant of Indian identity then. Subsequent events have rendered it 
even more absurd, primary among them the diaspora caused by federal reloca-
tion policies applied to reservation tribes80 and the continued exogamy that leads 
my nation to claim citizens of 1/2048 blood81 (eleven generations from a full 
blood Cherokee) who do not live in Cherokee communities. 
These citizens are Cherokee in a racist sense. I do not mean "racist" as a 
bloody red shirt, or as an all-purpose pejorative. I mean a logical corollary of 
Trofim Denisovich Lysenko's idea that behavior can be imprinted on the genes, 
the idea that caught the attention of Stalin and set Soviet genetics back for a 
generation,82 the same idea of blood and culture that caused Hitler to under-
stand Jews as a race. Everywhere we find race theory in its short violent history, 
it is traveling in disreputable company. Tribal governments are unlikely to have 
better luck building on this foundation of sand and blood than the colonial gov-
ernments have, and therefore might want to reexamine the idea of blood in any 
amount as an infallible proxy for culture. 
Citizenship by Culture 
A sovereign nation determines who qualifies for citizenship. If Indian tribes 
are indeed sovereign nations, nobody outside of an Indian tribe has any right to 
determine citizenship in that tribe. Sovereignty includes the right to suicide just 
as the individual right to life does—with apologies to Brian Clark, whose tribe 
is it, anyway?83 Everything herein is intended as a contribution to discussions 
within tribes and among tribes about the appropriate way to exercise tribal power, 
not as any suggestion that the tribal power does not or ought not exist. 
Carole Goldberg, who originated the Tribal Legal Development Clinic at 
UCLA, has stated the most important question for those exercising tribal power 
when she asks "if Indian nations want citizenship requirements to serve a par-
ticular set of values and purposes within their community, what kinds of citizen-
ship provisions will most effectively achieve those ends?"84 Goldberg goes on 
to chronicle attempts by the federal government to control tribal enrollment by 
direct and indirect means.85 
Taking as a given that Indian communities define themselves, some of those 
definitions are only esoteric. The community identifies individuals who by their 
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actions constitute and define the community.86 These circular self-definitions 
are not subject to exoteric review by any authority, and they are not, by defini-
tion, threatened by anything other than loss of population by disinterest. This is 
why Goldberg's statement of the question is so useful. She allows for the possi-
bility that the values and purposes the community might wish to preserve are 
entirely esoteric, completely internal. In that case, the reactions of federal or 
state governments are of little, if any, relevance. 
Federal recognition has been complicated by the casinophobia that is the 
subtext in the exchange above between Delphine Red Shirt and Kevin Gover. 
One response to the difficulties placed in the way of tribes seeking federal rec-
ognition is state recognition. There are problems with state recognition that go 
far beyond the observation that commerce with Indian tribes is a delegated power 
of the federal government. 
That delegation of power87 appears to be "plenary," most aptly meaning 
that the federal government, when it acts, preempts state power.88 Unfortunately 
for tribal sovereignty, "plenary power" in the Indian Commerce Clause reaches 
far beyond federal preemption to a near-conclusive presumption that any Con-
gressional action affecting Indians is constitutional.89 When states recognize 
Indian tribes, they arrogate to themselves the same expansive notion of plenary 
powers that the Supreme Court has crafted on the federal level, because state 
recognition means (with a few exceptions of federal laws piggybacked on state 
recognition)90 exactly what the states decide it means, including revocable at 
will. In a political atmosphere where states are seeking to control Indian tribes 
and the Supreme Court is as hostile to tribes as it has ever been,91 the gross 
distinction between state-recognized and federally-recognized becomes in the 
public eye a fine one. 
Before relying on the case law to keep federal recognition from being with-
drawn over failure to comply with some congressional desideratum, it would be 
good to consider both the composition of the current Court and that "[a] tribe's 
right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recog-
nized as central to its existence as an independent political community."92 That 
language in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez would appear to leave open the 
possibility that the federal government might be able to define Indian citizen-
ship as it likes fox federal purposes, and such a reading would not displace the 
current "government-to-government relationship" paradigm that is the federal 
mantra if not always the federal policy. 
Indians as tribal peoples occupy some peculiar constitutional space for equal 
protection purposes under the 14th Amendment, space we share with the Japa-
nese-Americans who were locked up for being of Japanese descent (without 
regard for citizenship) during World War II.93 The Court denied that the policy 
was race-based and denied that the concentration camps were concentration 
camps, as if "internment" was a superior way to lock up people under threat of 
lethal force. The "race" issue was simply wished away: "Korematsu was not 
excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was 
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excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire ,m The distinction 
between race and political affiliation was thus born in a case where the political 
affiliation was illusory. The people being singled out were not only mostly 
American citizens, but also similarly situated to German-Americans and Ital-
ian-Americans, for whom whiteness apparently functioned as a shield against 
maltreatment on a group level. 
Justices Owen Roberts, Frank Murphy, and Robert Jackson, who later served 
as chief prosecutor of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg,95 dissented. This sor-
did episode in American legal culture96 contained the seeds that flowered in 
federal Indian law into the proposition that while Indians as a "race" are pro-
tected by the 14th Amendment, Indians as citizens of their tribal nations are not 
a "suspect classification." The validity of laws that treat Indians based on their 
tribal citizenship is determined by whether the laws have a "rational basis," a 
question seldom answered in the negative. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo put it, 
". . .the thing that matters is not what I believe to be right. It is what I may 
reasonably believe that some other man of normal intellect and conscience might 
reasonably look upon as right."97 Subject to this thin veneer of rationality, the 
government may treat Indians as tribal members differently, whether the differ-
ence is to help or to hurt them.98 
In Morton v. Mancari (1974),99the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an Indian 
hiring preference in the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the basis that "Indian" was 
not a racial classification for equal protection purposes. In United States v. An-
telope (1977),100 Indians were subject to punishment for an offense under the 
Major Crimes Act that required less proof than would be required to convict 
white people under state law. This was held not to be based on race but on tribal 
citizenship. This line of cases—Mancari helping Indians and Antelope hurting 
them—stands for the principle that tribal citizenship is not race, and this is all 
that stands between Indians and a finding that any legal advantage to them un-
lawfully discriminates against white people. 
From the point of view of the colonizers, "Indian law is race law."101 Indian 
law dances around unpalatable subjects like race, claim of right based on Chris-
tianity,102 and defense of colonial arrangements without regard to any holistic 
view of the law.103 To complete the colonization process, to turn Indian govern-
ments into nothing more than social clubs, it is necessary to slip past Indian 
sovereignty in the courtroom and to portray Indian identity as naked race privi-
lege in the public eye.104 Historically, whiteness has been the valuable commod-
ity,105 and law has erected barriers to protect that property.106 In the case of 
American Indians, it is Indian racial status rather than white racial status that is 
thought to confer value.107 
While I would hesitate to liken it to property, tribal governments have the 
task of erecting legal barriers to the dilution of distinct cultures. All culture is 
learned. No exceptions. Language, religion, customs—all are learned. Leaving 
aside that the idea of inherited behavior is nonsense, it is dangerous because it 
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leads to the conflation of Indian blood with Indian citizenship. It makes a "ra-
cial" classification out of a political classification.108 That race (or blood) as a 
first principle gets conflated with color, with culture, with nationality, with reli-
gion, is quite understandable as an effort to pour meaning into a vessel without 
objective reality, but allowing the general public to get a whiff of race privilege 
pulls Indians into a defensive political position that could quickly become a 
defensive legal position.109 
Fergus Bordewich, for example, does his best to continue the tradition of 
portraying Indian sovereignty as race-conscious law,110 but it is unclear why 
Indians should join his enterprise. Race-conscious law presupposes that the 
government will assign racial labels or review the reasonableness of self-identi-
fication.111 The history of governmental race labeling is not a distinguished one,112 
and arguments against it are formidable.113 
There are also arguments in favor of governmental race labeling,114 but to 
refer to tribal citizenship as "defined on the basis of racial exclusion" is to 
ignore history, law, and common sense. Bordewich carries his claim over the 
edge of rationality by calling it " . . . obvious to anyone that legitimizing segre-
gation for Indians will set a precedent for its potential imposition upon black, 
Asian, and Hispanic Americans."115 The only way to rationalize Bordewich's 
remark is to ignore the race/citizenship distinction. If justice were to prevail, 
Indians would win that argument in court because of their distinctive legal sta-
tus, but it is hard to think that justice will start prevailing in U.S. courts after all 
these years. Allowing tribal citizenship to be portrayed as race-based in the 
court of public opinion gives the law courts another reason to reduce Indian 
tribes to social clubs, something they are often happy to do without apparent 
reason. 
In the court of public opinion, the rhetoric of race privilege is being de-
ployed by Upstate Citizens for Equality in New York,116 Citizens Equal Rights 
Alliance (CERA) in Montana,117 One Nation United in Oklahoma,118 United 
Property Owners in Washington,119 Protect Americans' Rights and Resources in 
Wisconsin,120 and, of course, the white citizens of Hawai'i who are united to 
prevent any re-recognition of the Native Hawaiian sovereignty.121 All of these 
groups have in common active hostility to all laws and policies that help indig-
enous people avoid the "melting pot," and they have all found that framing the 
sovereignty issue as race discrimination resonates with the public. While public 
opinion matters not a whit to the esoteric, familial aspects of Indian identity, it 
matters greatly to anything tribes expect from federal or state governments as 
tribes. It is therefore in the best interests of tribal governments to devalue the 
currency of racial privilege discourse. 
Culture tests for citizenship would be, as Carole Goldberg points out, terri-
bly complicated to administer in a fair manner.122 The United States manages to 
require a degree of cultural literacy for naturalization,123 and the problem for 
most tribal governments is naturalization, how to add new citizens rather than 
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how to revoke citizenships. It is not unreasonable to require applicants for natu-
ralization to know the people to whom they wish to be relatives. For tribes with 
a land base, residence may be an issue because lack of physical presence inter-
feres with one's ability to partake in ceremonial life (says the Oklahoma Chero-
kee who resides in Indiana). On the other hand, absentee citizens may constitute 
a tax base that cannot otherwise exist given the economic circumstances in much 
of Indian Country. 
Some believe that cultural literacy should trump other values.124 Certainly, 
it is hard to picture a citizenship that does not include some awareness of the 
social contract of which one is a part, whether or not that awareness can be 
termed "literacy." Literacy tests have a bad press because they were used to 
deny voting rights to freedmen after the Civil War, but they have never been 
struck down entirely, even in the voting rights context125 where the abuses oc-
curred. For Indian tribes, many of which have lost the advantage of a fluent 
population or have lost their language entirely, some broader concept of cul-
tural literacy is still important, alone or in combination with other requirements 
for citizenship. 
Nationhood v. Peoplehood 
Seen as part of the story of liberty, nationalism could be 
defined as a rational ideological framework for the realiza-
tion of rational, and highly laudable, political ends. But that 
was not how nationalism had made its presence felt in much 
of recent history. It has been the cause of the most destructive 
wars ever seen; it has justified the brutality of Nazism and 
Fascism; it has become the ideology of racial hatred in the 
colonies and has given birth to some of the most irrational 
revivalist movements as well as to the most oppressive politi-
cal regimes in the contemporary world.126 
Today, we call ourselves the "Cherokee Nation" because our semi-autono-
mous towns needed to be a nation to deal with the Westphalian nation-states in 
the midst of power struggles that originated in Europe. The Spanish, the French, 
the British, and the United States were all nations, and so our governmental 
structure had to change. Under the United States, we became, willy-nilly, "do-
mestic, dependent nations."127 
The inhabitants of the Americas had governments before the European In-
vasion. At Chaco Canyon, we have the ruins of a five-story building and archeo-
logical evidence of a vast trade network before European contact.128 There is 
evidence from archeology and from oral tradition of cities founded on agricul-
tural surplus in the Mississippi Valley and along the St. Lawrence, in addition to 
the better known empires of Central and South America, of road building, of 
trading relationships that spanned both American continents. 
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Indians had governments ranging from hereditary monarchies to represen-
tative democracies to "Athenian" democracies, but the Europeans were looking 
for kings. It is unclear whether Indians recognized fixed geographical borders 
in the same sense as they have defined the nation-state at least since the Treaty 
of Westphalia in 1648. Of course, Europeans were just developing the idea 
themselves, and, from an Indian perspective, it is as peculiar an idea of political 
geography as the one that enables a king in Europe to claim the entire Missis-
sippi watershed because one of his subjects dipped a toe in the Big Muddy. 
I would ask with Chatterjee whether the Westphalian nation-state is just so 
much more European baggage and, if so, whether it is a useful paradigm for 
tribal sovereignty or for answering the question posed so succinctly by Carole 
Goldberg? Leaving aside whether the Westphalian idea of statehood is "tradi-
tional," we are most likely entering a phase of history where the puissance of 
the nation-state as the primary model of social organization is being supplanted 
in many respects by the transnational corporation.129 Nation-states themselves 
struggle to maintain Westphalian sovereignty,130 and sub-national entities are 
pulled along in the propwash.131 If this analysis is correct, then tribal govern-
ments become, like states and provinces, sub-national polities with legitimate 
demands for self-government. The problem is transnational in scope;132 the battle-
ground is over which matters are appropriate to be governed at which level,133 
and sovereignty can no longer be conceived as absolute discretion upon a dis-
crete piece of real estate. 
Tom Holm and his colleagues offer an analysis of Indian studies as an aca-
demic discipline134 that might inform debate on Carole Goldberg's question re-
garding the "values and purposes" to be served by tribal citizenship criteria. 
They postulate a "peoplehood matrix" consisting of "four fundamental elements" 
that plainly do not describe a Westphalian state: "a sacred history; a well de-
fined territory and environment; a distinct language; and a characteristic cer-
emonial cycle." Most surviving American Indian tribes share these elements to 
some degree, and we all had them at one time. 
It is of course true that our histories, languages, and ceremonial cycles have 
been forcibly suppressed. It is also true that many of us have been removed 
from our well-defined territory and environment at gunpoint, a process described 
by the neologism "ethnic cleansing."135 Most of these governmental attempts to 
destroy Indian peoplehood are horrors we have in common (ironically in light 
of current events) with both Jews and Palestinians, in addition to tribal peoples 
of Rwanda and various ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. 
Neither public discourse generally nor academic discourse in particular 
casts human beings away from the peoplehood fire as punishment for lack of 
power to successfully resist ethnic cleansing. In fact, since World War II we 
have witnessed the growth of an international civil society that has taken legal 
actions against ethnic cleansing of Jews by Germany, Chinese by Japan, and the 
modern atrocities in Rwanda,136 the former Yugoslavia,137 and Sierra Leone.138 
The international community has even, over the objections of the United States, 
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created a permanent forum to try crimes of the sort that American Indians have 
endured.139 Viewed from the world stage, the peoplehood paradigm represents 
history, aspiration, and a petition for redress of grievances. It also avoids the 
trap of race discourse: 
The concept of peoplehood . . . adds a new dimension to 
political thought concerning disenfranchised or colonized Na-
tive American groups. The concept goes beyond the notion of 
race and even nationality. Historically Native American peoples 
adopted captives of several races. Adoption meant that the cap-
tive, regardless of race, became a member of a kin-group. His 
or her new relatives were obligated to assimilate the new fam-
ily member in terms of the four aspects of peoplehood. Race, 
to Native Americans, was not a factor of group identity or 
peoplehood. 
Nations—which are primarily viewed as the territorial lim-
its of states that encompass a number of communities—do not 
necessarily constitute a "people" nor do they have the perma-
nency of peoplehood.140 
The "permanency of peoplehood" has a positive ring to it, and it accounts 
for the social reality of American Indians imagining their communities on the 
spiritual level before they have the secular power to make demands on the po-
litical system, a process of nation-rebuilding very like that reported by Chatterjee 
among "other" Indians141 and precisely what is advocated by Wallace Coffey 
and Rebecca Tsosie,142 as well as a number of American Indian scholars that 
they cite. This is "[participation and memory as the basis for a tribe"143 and 
citizenship as a recognition of social reality here and now connected to tradi-
tions that antedate the United States. 
I've sent in my absentee ballot, so the time to grill the people who are 
campaigning to represent me about the meaning of "traditional" is past for an-
other election year. However, the question is not going to go away, and the 
answers generated within tribal governments will determine, for better or for 
worse, the permanency of our peoplehood on the global map. Where we live 
together, of course, that is not the whole story. The U.S. Supreme Court, speak-
ing of the importance of religion in mainstream society, located it in ". . . the 
inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize 
through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade 
that citadel."144 Tribal identity is similar but not identical. Tribal identity is lo-
cated not in individuals but in a people, and it will never be within the power of 
the U.S. government to invade that citadel. Therein lies the awesome responsi-
bility of tribal governments: peoplehood can't be taken from us, but we can 
surrender it in exchange for an imagined race or an illusory nation. 
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